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SUBJECT: THE STRUCTURE AND PROGRESS OF THE EU'S CIV-MIL CELL

Classified By: USEU Poloff Lee Litzenberger for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

1. (C/NF) Summary: The EU has created a civilian-military cell designed to enhance its strategic and operational planning capabilities without detracting from NATO's role as "the natural choice" for a military operation involving the European and American allies." Declared operational on 1 June 2005, it consists of two components: a branch of civilian and military planners who do strategic advance planning for civilian, military, and civilian-military ESDP operations, and a permanent military staff able to rapidly set up and run an operations center in the event of an EU Council-authorized autonomous EU operation. It is currently working with DG E IX, the civilian crisis management unit in the Council Secretariat, to ensure compatible development of military and civilian capabilities (as laid out in the military Headline Goal 2010 and civilian Headline Goal 2008). It has also been designated as the primary planning body responsible for the upcoming EU-led civilian monitoring mission to Aceh. The cell's director acknowledges shortcomings in coordination and capabilities, but this may be due to the limited amount of time the cell has been functioning rather than a lack of political will to see the cell become an effective crisis management tool for the EU. End summary.

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Background  
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2. (C/NF) The EU's civilian-military cell was created as a compromise negotiated by the UK, France, and Germany and was endorsed by the European Council in December 2003. France and Germany, along with Belgium and Luxembourg, had previously called for an independent EU operational headquarters in April 2003, but the UK opposed the measure in keeping with its preference to advance the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in ways that would not detract from NATO. The cell was established within the EU Military Staff (EUMS) of the Council Secretariat but is expected to work across the EU with civilian units like DG E IX in order to anticipate crises and "develop expertise in managing the civilian/military interface" of crisis response issues. The cell has a planning branch that assists the EUMS and DG E IX with strategic advance planning for civilian, military, and joint ESDP operations. It also houses a permanent ops center staff responsible for generating the capacity to rapidly set up and run an ops center in the event of an autonomous EU operation, which occurs if: 1) NATO as a whole chooses not to engage; 2) the EU opts not to make use of NATO assets and capabilities through Berlin Plus arrangements; and 3) no national HQ is identified for the operation. The civ-mil cell was declared operational on 1 June 2005.

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Mission and Structure  
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3. (C/NF) The mission and structure of the civ-mil cell are essentially twofold. On the strategic level, the 17 civilian and military planners of the strategic planning branch assist the EUMS and DG E with advance planning and coordination for ESDP operations, whether they are civilian, military, or integrated. It does so at the initiative of Secretary General/High Representative Javier Solana or the Political and Security Committee (PSC). On the operational level, the cell includes a permanent staff of eight military officers (double-hatted from the EUMS) who can, in the event of an autonomous EU operation, reinforce a national HQ or generate the capacity to set up and run an independent operations center. They also serve as a "housekeeping" team to maintain the premises when the ops center is not in use. Including the director of the cell (currently Brigadier General Horst-Heinrich Brauss) and three deputies, the cell totals 29 positions, which are staffed on a three-year rotational basis.

4. (C/NF) If the Council decides to activate the ops center, the permanent staff increases by up to 50 civilian and military planners who are deployed under the operations commander (for the military component) or DG E (for the civilian component). The ops center becomes fully operational when additional augmentees from EUMS, DG E, and

member states are added to the staff, the maximum of which is supposed to be 89 according to trilateral working documents. On July 25, however, General Brauss told USG officials that it could exceed 100 personnel, possibly in reference to the rest of the civ-mil cell staff who could join the ops center roster.

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The Present and Future  
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15. (C/NF) At the same 25 July meeting, officers from the civ-mil cell told senior planners from S/CRS that they are currently working with DG E IX to ensure compatibility between the objectives, documents, training, and other elements of the military Headline Goal 2010 and the civilian Headline Goal 2008. (Note: Headline Goal 2010 strives to develop military capabilities that match the ambitions of the European Security Strategy through the establishment of the European Defense Agency, battlegroups, and other milestones. Headline Goal 2008 calls for "integrated civilian crisis management packages" consisting of experts in police, rule of law, civil administration, civil protection, monitoring, and other support tasks that can deploy by themselves or in close coordination with military efforts. Its aims include drawing up a Capabilities Requirements List and illustrative training scenarios, for which the cell,s officers say they have been providing input. End note.) They said that cooperation with DG E IX has been facilitated by the fact that both units work in the same building, although there is still lingering concerns that the cell will focus disproportionately on military planning due to its location within the EUMS.

16. (C/NF) General Brauss made it clear that the cell still lacks coordination and planning capabilities. He noted that it has been difficult bridging the gap between the Council and the Commission, which controls the budget for civilian ESDP operations. He was insistent on the need for the EU to have planning capabilities for integrated operations and specifically identified a need for more pol-mil officers to help broaden the strategic military perspective. Brauss also defended the existence of an independent ops center, pointing out that NATO planning via Berlin Plus had proven cumbersome when implemented for the EUFOR takeover in Bosnia. He opined that SHAPE,s military planning structures are not necessarily suited for the flexible planning required for short-fuse integrated missions. Brauss expressed hope, however, that the projected reciprocal liaison cells within SHAPE and the EUMS would ensure broader EU-NATO coordination on crisis management. (Note: Planning for the liaison cells is in the final stages. On 29 July, NATO SYG Jaap de Hoop Scheffer sent SG/HR Solana a letter indicating NATO,s readiness to agree to the EU team's proposals (sent to NATO in December) and to "(implement) the agreements in parallel once the details of the staffing arrangements have been settled in both organizations." End note.)

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The Aceh Mission  
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17. (C/NF) The civ-mil cell has been assigned primary planning responsibility for the upcoming civilian monitoring mission to Aceh, which came from a request "out of the blue" from UNSR Ahtisaari (operations are usually initiated by member states or the Council Secretariat). Brauss said that the cell has already developed a crisis management concept to monitor a ceasefire that is being negotiated between the Indonesian government and GAM rebels. The elements of the ceasefire are likely to include demobilization, decommissioning, reintegration, human rights, legislative changes, and more. The EU-led mission, expected to comprise 250-350 personnel from the EU, Norway, Switzerland, and ASEAN countries, is scheduled to begin 15 September. An initial monitoring presence (IMP) will deploy 15 August to set up logistics, accommodations, and security briefings.

18. (C/NF) Comment: In discussions with DG E IX--which has 30 planners to the cell,s 17--and the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM), the cell was portrayed as more of a planning instrument than an actor in its own right. As for the ops center, the actual facility consists of one unfurnished room and some within the EU appear to believe that they can prevent its activation by ensuring that a national HQ is always made available for an ESDP military operation. It seems unlikely, however that the EU would carve out space and pledge several million euros to establish a facility with communication and computer equipment and allow it to remain unused. Even the UK, which initially sought to emphasize the precedence of NATO and national HQs for military operations, seems to have recognized the value of creating a capable planning unit for civilian and integrated missions within the EU. In fact, UK reps have said that exercising the civ-mil cell will be one of its priorities during its presidency, and the Aceh mission may be a timely opportunity to do so. We anticipate that political and

institutional pressure to activate the ops center once created will be irresistible. End comment.

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